# This Week in SBOMs: Java4Shell, NGINX2Root, and the First CRA Standards

> SBOM news for 14 to 20 November 2026: Java4Shell in OpenJDK, two nginx HTTP/2 RCEs, Ruby2Shell and a large PHP security release, a compromised Microsoft agent-framework release on PyPI, hijacked Optimizely snippets, the first EN 40000 CRA standards, the Bundesrat clearing Germany's CRA act, France's NIS2 vote, UK financial regulators naming SBOMs and cryptographic inventories, VERS 1st edition heading to Ecma, free SBOM, CBOM, HBOM and AIBOM validators on sbomify.com, and sbomify v26.11.1, which gives releases a lifecycle.

- **Author:** Cowboy Neil
- **Published:** 2026-11-20
- **Categories:** News
- **Tags:** Sbom, This-Week-in-Sboms, Supply-Chain, Java, Openjdk, Nginx, Ruby, Php, Pypi, Kev, Openssl, Cra, En-40000, Nis2, Enisa, Cisa, Cbom, Vex, Spdx, Cyclonedx, Purl, Vers

**TL;DR:** Three runtimes that hide inside other products all shipped critical fixes within three days. Java4Shell is a pre-auth RCE in OpenJDK's Base64 intrinsic, and CISA warned that Java runtimes 'may not appear as separate entries in software inventories'. nginx fixed two HTTP/2 RCEs, one present since 2015. Ruby fixed seven bugs with known PoCs, and PHP fixed seven Critical issues. Malicious agent-framework releases reached PyPI, and Optimizely's CDN served injected JavaScript. On the regulatory side, CEN-CENELEC published EN 40000-1-1 and 1-2, the first CRA standards. Germany's Bundesrat cleared the CRA implementation act, and France's Assemblée nationale passed its NIS2 bill. UK financial regulators named SBOMs and cryptographic inventories in new guidance. VERS 1st edition was tagged for the December Ecma General Assembly. And in house news, sbomify.com now has free in-browser validators for SBOMs, CBOMs, HBOMs and AIBOMs, which check against CISA 2026, NTIA and BSI TR-03183-2, and sbomify v26.11.1 gives every release a lifecycle, so only the releases you still support are scanned, re-checked against VEX and tracked in Dependency-Track.

This marks the fifth edition of **This Week in SBOMs**, covering the period from **Saturday 14 to Friday 20 November 2026**. [Last week](https://sbomify.com/2026/11/13/this-week-in-sboms-2026-11-13/) the build system was the target; this week attention shifted to execution environments. Three language runtimes and a ubiquitous web server released critical patches within about three days. Each of these is typically packaged as part of another vendor’s solution.

Regarding regulation, the CRA has finally issued its standards, while two national legislatures moved.

## The big one: Java4Shell, and the runtimes nobody lists

On **17 November**, OpenJDK released its [quarterly advisory](https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17). The lead item concerns [CVE-2026-114938](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-114938/) located in `hotspot/compiler`, rated CVSS 8.1 and dubbed **Java4Shell** by [Calif](https://calif.io/java4shell/). The flaw resides within custom AVX-512 VBMI assembly code used by HotSpot to accelerate Base64 decoding on x86-64 processors. An adversarial input causes the function to calculate a negative length, resulting in memory writes beyond the allocated array boundary. Calif states the issue impacts OpenJDK versions 17.0.6 and above on CPUs supporting AVX-512 VBMI, while "ARM64 CPUs are not affected". The advisory identifies vulnerable versions as "27.0.1.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 17.0.21.0.3, 11.0.33, 8u512, and earlier". Temporary mitigations until a patch is deployed are `-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics` or `-XX:UseAVX=2`, available exclusively on x86-64 systems.

CISA released an [alert](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/17/critical-java-vulnerability-requires-immediate-patching) that day, and it reads like an SBOM brief: "Review your software inventory for JDKs and Java runtimes, including those bundled with third-party applications or included in container images and appliances." It further notes: "Note: JDKs and Java runtimes may not appear as separate entries in software inventories." Germany's BSI [issued a warning](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Cybersicherheitswarnungen/DE/2026/2026-306673-1032_bits.html) on 18 November that GreyNoise had already observed initial exploitation attempts. CERT-In [followed](https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES02&VLCODE=CIAD-2026-0061) the same day. Java4Shell is not currently listed in KEV. On oss-security, Solar Designer [pointed out](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/19/5) that a fix for this specific code path had been proposed and closed without merging three months earlier. ([THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/java4shell-cve-2026-114938-enables-pre.html), [HN](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50538240))

**Why this matters for SBOM/VEX practitioners:** we are seeing the Log4Shell lesson recur at a deeper layer. Calif identifies Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate as reachable in default setups. Several distribute their own runtime: [Keycloak indicates](https://www.keycloak.org/2026/11/java4shell-vulnerability-cve-2026-114938) that its "x86-64 Keycloak container images tagged 26.8.2-1 and 26.8.2-2 bundle an affected OpenJDK 21.0.13 build". If your SBOMs document the JDK as a component with its precise build number, finding it is a single query. If they only track the application layer, expect a week of requests to vendors. Exploitability also hinges on CPU architecture, a rare instance where hardware specifications belong in a VEX rationale. "Not affected: ARM64 deployment" is accurate, provided you can verify where the workload executes.

## Security news that mattered

**NGINX2Root: two HTTP/2 RCEs in nginx (18 November).** nginx 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 address [ten issues](https://nginx.org/en/security_advisories.html). Two are memory safety errors in HTTP/2: [CVE-2026-123007](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-123007/), "Memory corruption in HTTP/2 flow control" (nginx severity: major, affected 1.9.5 through 1.31.8), and [CVE-2026-123633](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-123633/), a use-after-free (nginx severity: medium, affected 1.19.7 through 1.31.8). [Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-http2-rce-vulnerabilities) is among five groups credited with discovering them separately. The "root" component relies on a distinct, undisclosed Linux SCTP privilege escalation; its discoverers state that the fix "will be released in the coming weeks" ([oss-security](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/18/16)). The temporary mitigation is `http2 off`. ([THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/10-year-old-nginx-http2-flaw-lets.html), [HN](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50547374)) _Why it matters:_ nginx resides in appliances, ingress controllers and products such as GitLab. An HN discussion already questions why [GitLab 19.6.0](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50561571) continues shipping vulnerable nginx versions. Your vendors' SBOMs should specify the nginx version; request this information.

**Ruby2Shell and six more Ruby bugs (18 November).** Ruby [released](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/11/18/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-regexp-and-string/) 4.0.10, 3.4.13 and 3.3.14 for seven flaws in the regex engine and string case conversion, saying "We are aware of PoCs that prove some of them can be used to trigger remote code execution." The one [Veria Labs](https://verialabs.com/ruby2shell/) named Ruby2Shell, [CVE-2026-132825](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-132825/), is a one-byte heap overflow that it says is reachable pre-auth on default Rails and Sinatra apps. Ruby 3.2 and earlier are end-of-life and get no fix. Veria's line is the SBOM point in one sentence: "These products bundle their own Ruby, so the fix has to come from the vendor." Its table lists GitHub Enterprise Server 3.22.5 and earlier with no fixed release yet. ([THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/ruby-releases-fixes-for-7-regex-and.html), [HN](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50556287))

**PHP fixes seven Critical issues (19 November).** PHP 8.6.0, 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 and 8.2.36 fix 17 advisories ([php.net](https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php), [GHSAs](https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories)) and bundle uriparser 1.0.3. The pre-announcement said the Critical ones "require either non-default configuration or uncommon setups". One is supply-chain shaped: [CVE-2026-128090](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-128090/), a Phar OpenSSL signature bypass through algorithm downgrade. ([THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/php-fixes-7-critical-flaws-including.html)) _Why it matters:_ after PHP2Shell, [we noted](https://sbomify.com/2026/11/13/this-week-in-sboms-2026-11-13/) that PHP compiled into official Docker images is owned by no package manager. The same applies to these fixes.

**Microsoft's agent-framework compromised on PyPI (17 November).** [Socket](https://socket.dev/blog/agent-framework-pypi-package-compromised-with-credential-stealer) reports that `agent-framework` 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 were published on 17 November with `.pth` startup hooks. These run on every Python start, including `pip` itself. The hooks collected environment secrets and Azure CLI, npm, Git and Docker credential files, and requested fresh Azure managed-identity and DevOps OIDC tokens. Both versions are gone; PyPI now shows 1.26.0 as the latest. According to THN, Microsoft said it had made "some repositories private while we investigate", and `microsoft/onnxruntime` returned 404 when we checked. How the attacker obtained publish access has not been disclosed. ([THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/attackers-compromise-microsofts-agent.html), [HN](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50539610)) _Why it matters:_ search your SBOMs and lockfiles for exactly these two versions. A `.pth` hook runs during the build, so check build hosts and CI runners as well as deployed environments.

**Optimizely snippets served injected JavaScript (16 to 18 November).** Optimizely [says](https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z) an attacker "exploited a flaw in the Optimizely Web Experimentation account signup flow" to inject code into customer projects, affecting "Less than 5% of our customers". [Report URI](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/) found the code in 188 of 1,611 snippets it checked, including a card skimmer. ([Krebs](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/11/attackers-used-optimizely-to-a-b-test-malware-on-top-websites/), [THN](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hijacked-optimizely-scripts-served-card.html), [HN](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50524767)) _Why it matters:_ third-party scripts loaded at runtime never appear in a build-time SBOM. If you inventory web front ends, list external script origins as services.

**Also worth your time:**

- **OpenSSL** [pre-announced](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/17/6) three Low fixes for 4.1.1, 4.0.4 and 3.5.10 on 1 December. Separately, [CVE-2026-121481](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-121481/) in `EVP_EncodeBlock()` is rated Low by OpenSSL ("No path by which an attacker can trigger this has been identified"). CISA-ADP nonetheless added a CVSS 9.8 to the record, and an [HN thread](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50569226) carried the 9.8 in its title. This is a good case for a VEX statement rather than a fire drill.
- **Apache Roller** [CVE-2026-129448](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-129448/), an unauthenticated deserialisation bug fixed in 6.1.6, "is being actively exploited" according to the [ASF](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/17/5). It was not in KEV as of the 18 November catalogue.
- **SSHole follow-up:** Solar Designer [reports](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/16/1) that musl will likely move to the same `*0`/`*1` failure tokens as libxcrypt before eventually returning NULL. We found nothing new from Buildroot.

**KEV.** Five additions in the window, catalogue version 2026.11.18. Two are open-source components. BerriAI LiteLLM [CVE-2026-40217](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-40217/) is due 2 December; this is an AI gateway that many teams pull in as a Python dependency. Apache Axis [CVE-2026-90436](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90436/) is due 21 November; it is an old transitive Java library that Rapid7 reports was exploited through Confluence Data Center, which embeds it. The others are Puppet Enterprise [CVE-2026-115731](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-115731/), Synology DSM [CVE-2024-10441](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2024-10441/) and REDCap [CVE-2026-90817](https://insights.sbomify.com/CVE-2026-90817/). See our [KEV explainer](https://sbomify.com/2025/12/30/what-is-kev-cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities/).

## CRA

**The first CRA standards are published (18 to 19 November).** CEN-CENELEC [announced](https://www.cencenelec.eu/news-events/news/2026/en-in-the-spotlight/2026-11-19-cra-standards-en-40000-1-1-and-en-40000-1-2/) "the publication of two new European Standards: EN 40000-1-1 on cybersecurity terminology and EN 40000-1-2 on cybersecurity principles, product risk management and lifecycle activities". FprEN 40000-1-3 and the first vertical standards are to follow; the Commission [counts](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/first-european-standard-published-support-cyber-resilience-act) "over 30 standards in the making". We found no Official Journal reference, so neither standard yet carries a presumption of conformity. _Why it matters:_ 1-2 is the risk-management and lifecycle backbone that the SBOM and vulnerability-handling parts will hang off. Vulnerability handling is in 1-3, which is not out yet. Background is on our [CRA page](https://sbomify.com/compliance/eu-cra/).

**Germany: the Bundesrat clears the CRA act (20 November).** In session 1070 the Bundesrat [decided](https://www.bundesrat.de/drs.html?id=621-26%28B%29) not to call the mediation committee on the implementation act the Bundestag passed on 15 October (Drucksache 621/26). The law can now go for signature and promulgation. According to the Bundesrat's [explanatory note](https://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/TO/1070/erl/7.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1), the BSI becomes the market surveillance and notifying authority and will support SMEs and open-source software stewards. _Why it matters:_ the authority that will read German manufacturers' SBOMs is also the one that wrote [TR-03183](https://sbomify.com/compliance/bsi-tr-03183/).

**ENISA: SRP 1.4 and a notified-body gap analysis.** The [SRP page](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/product-security/vulnerability-services/eu-incident-response-and-cyber-crisis-management/single-reporting-platform-srp) says that on 17 November the platform "was upgraded to version 1.4". The documentation "is currently being updated", and ENISA has published no changelog. On 16 November ENISA published a [gap analysis](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cra-module-b-and-h-cabs-accreditation-for-notification) of notified-body accreditation for CRA Modules B and H. It says assessors need the competence "to assess machine-readable SBOMs and verify their completeness and consistency against the TOE", with familiarity with "CycloneDX 1.4 or higher or SPDX 2.3 or higher". The document is non-binding, but it is the clearest statement yet of the SBOM floor a third-party assessor will expect.

**Eclipse ORC.** The due-diligence task force [merged](https://github.com/orcwg/cra-due-diligence) a proposal on what open-source projects provide, which says "Licensing metadata should be captured directly within standardized Software Bills of Materials". The CRA FAQ did not grow this week.

## NIS2

**France: the Assemblée nationale adopts the resilience bill (17 November).** The bill transposing NIS2 and CER [passed](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/actualites-accueil-hub/adoption-du-projet-de-loi-relatif-a-la-resilience-des-infrastructures-critiques-et-au-renforcement-de-la-cybersecurite) at first reading, 464 to 64 ([scrutin 9916](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/scrutins/9916)). The Senate adopted its own version in March 2025, so the texts still need reconciling. It is not law yet.

The 19 November infringement package had no NIS2 actions. See our [NIS2 page](https://sbomify.com/compliance/eu-nis2/).

## CISA and US regulators

Beyond the Java4Shell alert and KEV, it was quiet. The Federal Register had no hits in the window for "software bill of materials", SBOM, "cryptographic inventory", "secure software development" or FASCSA. CISA published no SBOM, VEX or Secure by Design material, and the [2026 Minimum Elements](https://sbomify.com/compliance/cisa-minimum-elements/) are unchanged. NIST [announced](https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2026/nist-will-revise-tls-guidelines) on 19 November that it will revise SP 800-52 Rev. 2 to "Add support for post-quantum algorithms" and deprecate weaker TLS 1.2 suites. Another nudge towards a [CBOM](https://sbomify.com/faq/what-is-a-cbom/).

## Other regulators

**UK financial regulators name SBOMs and cryptographic inventories (19 November).** The Bank of England, PRA and FCA opened consultation [GC26/9](https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/guidance-consultations/gc26-9-cyber-risk-resilience-management) on cyber resilience guidance, closing 26 February 2027. It expects firms to "keep an up-to-date inventory of their key assets, third-party dependencies and cyber risks". The accompanying [AI effective practices](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2026/november/effective-practices-cyber-risk-and-resilience-management-relating-to-artificial-intelligence) list "software bills of materials" among the sources for identifying exposures. The [quantum effective practices](https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2026/november/effective-practices-cyber-risk-and-resilience-management-relating-to-quantum-computing) describe "a 'cryptographic inventory'" for planning PQC migration. The FCA [says](https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/uk-financial-watchdogs-clarify-cyber-expectations-attacks-rise) October incident reports were "52% above the previous high recorded in May 2025". _Why it matters:_ this is guidance, not a mandate. Still, UK-regulated firms and their suppliers now have supervisors pointing at SBOMs and CBOMs by name.

**Germany.** The BSI's [annual report](https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2026/261119_Lagebericht.html) (19 November) counts 160 new vulnerabilities a day and says time-to-exploit fell to eight days in Q2 2026. TR-03183 is unchanged.

**UK Bill.** Commons consideration of Lords amendments to the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is still set for 24 November. The amendment papers did not load for us, so we cannot say whether any touch the software supply chain.

Nothing new from METI, CSA Singapore or CERT-In on SBOMs; Australia and Canada did not load.

## Standards

**VERS 1st edition is ready for the Ecma GA (17 November).** Ecma TC54 [tagged](https://github.com/Ecma-TC54/ECMA-xxx-VERS/releases/tag/edition-1.0.0) `edition-1.0.0`, which "matches the content submitted to the Ecma GA for review and approval at the December GA meeting". [vers-spec v1.2.2](https://github.com/package-url/vers-spec/releases/tag/v1.2.2) brings the community spec in line. _Why it matters:_ VERS is the version-range syntax that VEX and advisory tooling will cite. This is the text it will be cited as.

**A PURL registry for software outside public registries.** A proposed [design document](https://github.com/package-url/purl-spec/tree/main/docs/design) landed in purl-spec on 17 November. It tackles what it calls "One of the biggest challenges for universal PURL adoption": identifying "Commercial or proprietary software including internal use only software". It builds on the `software-id` type, where the namespace starts with an internet domain, and has publishers serve a `/.well-known/purl.json`. It is only a proposal, but it targets the C/C++ and proprietary-component gap that hurts SBOM matching most.

**CycloneDX.** Still 1.7.2, so the November target for 2.0 has not been met so far. A new umbrella issue, [#1221](https://github.com/CycloneDX/specification/issues/1221), aims to "create one source of truth" for how 2.0 references ISO and RFC formats, which suggests the schema is not frozen. On 1.x, [#1219](https://github.com/CycloneDX/specification/pull/1219) adds Composite ML-DSA to the cryptography registry for CBOM generators. We found no minutes for TC54's 12 November discussion of normative references to SPDX.

**SPDX.** Still 3.1 RC1. [#1474](https://github.com/spdx/spdx-3-model/pull/1474) recommends SHA-256 or stronger, says MD5 and SHA-1 are not collision resistant, and deprecates the Dilithium, Kyber and FALCON entries "because they are not hash algorithms". New issue [#1495](https://github.com/spdx/spdx-3-model/issues/1495) notes that after 2.3 to 3.0 conversion "a converted SBOM can no longer say whether a patch has been" applied. That matters if you track distro backports.

## The wider landscape

- **OpenSSF:** the TAC vote ratifying the Supply Chain Integrity working group charter [passed](https://github.com/ossf/tac/issues/682) 8 to 0 on 19 November. A [17 November post](https://openssf.org/blog/2026/11/17/clearer-security-signals-making-attestations-comprehensible-for-pypi-users/) says PyPI now has redesigned project pages with "a dedicated security tab" for attestations.
- **Dependency-Track 5.2.2 and 4.14.7 (18 November):** [5.2.2](https://github.com/DependencyTrack/dependency-track/releases) updates the default ENISA EU KEV catalogue source and fixes CEL policies "not taking analysis overrides into account". If you record VEX-style analyses in Dependency-Track, that second fix matters.
- **CycloneDX tooling:** [cdxgen 13.8.0](https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/releases) (14 November) "closes twenty-six advisories". 12.9.3 backports a fix where "scanned content could make cdxgen run project tooling": your SBOM generator runs on untrusted input. [cyclonedx-python 9.0.0](https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-python/releases) adds an opt-in `--add-python-runtime`, which adds the interpreter itself as a component.

## House news: free BOM validators, and releases that retire

This column leaves vendor announcements out, so this section is flagged as ours. Two things shipped this week.

**Free SBOM, CBOM, HBOM and AIBOM validators (17 and 19 November).** sbomify.com now has a [Tools section](https://sbomify.com/tools/) with four free checkers. All of them run entirely in your browser, so the file is never uploaded.

- The [SBOM checker](https://sbomify.com/tools/sbom-checker/) validates CycloneDX 1.2 to 1.7 and SPDX 2.2, 2.3, 3.0.0 and 3.0.1 JSON against the official schema. It then checks the document against the [CISA 2026 Minimum Elements](https://sbomify.com/compliance/cisa-minimum-elements/), the [NTIA Minimum Elements](https://sbomify.com/compliance/ntia-minimum-elements/) and [BSI TR-03183-2](https://sbomify.com/compliance/bsi-tr-03183/), the German guideline for CRA SBOMs. Every failed element links to the guide that explains it and to the [schema crosswalk](https://sbomify.com/compliance/schema-crosswalk/). It can also check that the external references and linked SBOMs resolve, with hash verification. Your browser makes those requests itself, and only when you start them.
- The [CBOM validator](https://sbomify.com/tools/cbom-checker/) checks a CycloneDX 1.6 or 1.7 Cryptography BOM against the schema. It also checks that every algorithm, certificate, protocol and key carries the fields that identify it, and that references between assets resolve.
- The [HBOM validator](https://sbomify.com/tools/hbom-checker/) checks CycloneDX hardware BOMs for a name, a manufacturer and a version or revision on every device, plus a hardware identifier.
- The [AIBOM validator](https://sbomify.com/tools/aibom-checker/) takes a CycloneDX 1.5 to 1.7 ML-BOM or an SPDX 3 AI BOM. It checks that every model has a supplier, a version and a model card, and that SPDX 3 models and datasets carry the properties their profiles make mandatory.

_Why it matters:_ this week UK financial supervisors asked for cryptographic inventories, and last week a UK department started requiring an AIBOM. Supervisors and procurement teams are moving from asking whether you have a BOM to asking whether it is any good. A failed field on one of these reports is cheaper to find before a customer or assessor reads the file. ENISA's notified-body analysis above expects assessors to check SBOM completeness.

**sbomify v26.11.1 lets releases retire (17 November).** We shipped [sbomify v26.11.1](https://sbomify.com/2026/11/17/announcing-sbomify-v26-11-1-the-one-that-lets-releases-retire/) ([release notes](https://github.com/sbomify/sbomify/releases/tag/v26.11.1)). It gives every release a lifecycle. A release can declare what it replaces, either on the **same line** (1.2.4 retires 1.2.3) or as a **new line** (2.0 follows 1.2, and both stay supported), and it can carry end-of-support and end-of-life dates. From CI, `POST /api/v1/releases` takes a `supersedes` list that names the predecessor by its version.

sbomify continues to track solely what is currently active. Scheduled scans, along with the re-application of VEX records and Dependency-Track, encompass live releases and the most recent build for each component, excluding any older versions. Once a release passes its support deadline, it retires automatically. A retired release indicates the date of its final scan and the reason scanning ceased, rather than displaying outdated counts as current figures. Dependency-Track is now organised by release series; consequently, a replacement takes over its predecessor's projects, together with your audit decisions. This approach adheres to the [Common Lifecycle Enumeration](https://sbomify.com/compliance/cle/) (ECMA-428).

_Why it matters:_ in a week where Java, Ruby, PHP and nginx all address critical vulnerabilities, you must identify which releases still require fixes for your customers. The CRA poses an identical query regarding support periods. Self-hosters should review the upgrade notes first: there is a one-off Dependency-Track backfill operation, and Redis has been replaced by Valkey.

## What to watch next week

- Vendor patches for bundled Java, Ruby and nginx, particularly for GitHub Enterprise Server and GitLab, and whether any runtime bugs from this week appear on the KEV list.
- The SCTP kernel correction underpinning the "root" component of NGINX2Root.
- OpenSSL's releases scheduled for 1 December, and whether the score assigned to CVE-2026-121481 is amended.
- Promulgation of Germany's CRA legislation, FprEN 40000-1-3, and any available changelog for SRP 1.4.
- The Commons' consideration of the UK Bill on 24 November, and MAS concluding its consultation on 23 November.
- A CycloneDX 2.0 release candidate, provided November remains the intended target.

_This Week in SBOMs concentrates on regulation, standards and the open-source ecosystem. It omits vendor product announcements and marketing but covers vendors' own security incidents. Releases from our own organisation, when referenced, are marked as house news. Noticed something we overlooked? Contact us._

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From sbomify: https://sbomify.com/2026/11/20/this-week-in-sboms-2026-11-20/
